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Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: 
Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Abstract 
Scholars  who  study  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs)  recognize  the  complex  relationship  between 
international business and society. However, compared to other international business topics, research on 
politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility (CSR) -- three ‘lenses’ on the MNE -- remains 
somewhat embryonic, with critical unresolved issues regarding frameworks, measurement, methods and 
theory. This creates rich opportunities for integration and extension of disciplinary perspectives, which 
we explore in this article. Building on the three lenses framework, we identify common concepts and 
tools, outline an agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research, and review the papers in this 
Focused Issue of the Journal of International Business Studies.  
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Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: 
Politics, Corruption, and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Introduction 
Scholarly  interest  on  the  relationship  between  international  business  and  society  is  growing 
among researchers who study multinational enterprises (MNEs). History is largely responsible for this 
surge in research, specifically, the political-economic history of last quarter-century.  From the late 1970s 
to the present, the global commercial landscape has so profoundly changed that it is difficult to recall the 
setting of international business prior to Deng Xiaoping’s dramatic economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
the neo-liberal wave that swept into Latin America in the eighties, and the decade of opening and reform 
that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.  Since 1990, the number of countries, markets and 
institutional settings open to the vast majority of the world has risen at an unprecedented pace.  The 
ensuing and rapid integration of world financial and goods markets brought forth a renewed appreciation 
of the diversity in social and economic institutions that govern the behaviors of firms.   
 The rapid pace of globalization and the concomitant increase in the volume of international trade 
and investment, coupled with recent corporate scandals, have heightened the importance of issues relating 
to politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility (CSR).   Each of these three topics provides a 
unique ‘lens’ through which to understand how MNEs influence and react to dimensions of their global 
economic and political environments.    
Research on each of these ‘three lenses’ on the multinational enterprise is somewhat embryonic, 
however,  when  compared  to  other  international  business  topics.    Critical issues  regarding  theoretical 
frameworks, measurement and methods remain unresolved.  From a scientific standpoint, an even more 
troubling trend has been the development of three parallel literatures on these topics.  This is problematic 
because it is clear that the issues are related.  Therefore, there are substantial benefits associated with 
integrating these streams of research in terms of enhancing the quality of research on each topic.  At the 
same  time,  the  nascent  and  fragmented  nature  of  these  literatures  suggests  that  such  an  integration   5 
requires  consideration  of  these  issues  across  numerous  business  disciplines  (e.g.,  strategy,  finance, 
accounting,  marketing)  and  social  science  disciplines  (e.g.,  economics,  political  science,  sociology, 
psychology,  geography).    Moreover,  these  topics  are  germane  to  countries  at  all  levels  of  economic 
development, and may be pursued via theoretical and empirical (quantitative or qualitative) efforts. Thus, 
it appears that work clarifying and integrating these “three lenses” is fertile ground for interdisciplinary 
theory development and empirical analysis such as takes place in the Journal of International Business 
Studies.   
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the most important 
common theme in the literatures on the three lenses: the analysis of antecedents and outcomes. A second 
theme  running  through  our  literatures  review  is  the  importance  of  the  unit  of  analysis  and  level  of 
aggregation. In the context of MNE political strategies, this leads to a consideration of subsidiary, firm, 
industry and institutional (home and host) level variables. In the context of corruption and MNEs, this 
leads to an examination of the effects of MNEs on the environment of corruption, the determinants of the 
experience of and involvement with corruption, and MNE strategies for coping with public corruption. In 
the context of CSR and MNEs, this leads to a consideration of the roles of strategy and asymmetric 
information/transparency in determining the extent to which firms engage in CSR and the returns to this 
activity. Section III outlines an agenda for theoretical and empirical research on the strategic implications 
for international business of politics, corruption and CSR.   Section IV provides brief  reviews of the 
articles in the Focused Issue and discusses their relevance to our proposed research agenda.  Section V 
concludes.  
 
Antecedents and outcomes  
Politics and the multinational enterprise  
The interactions between business and government is perhaps the lens with the longest standing 
tradition of research within international business, yet this stream suffers from relative neglect compared 
to  the  market  environment  of  business  (Baron,  1995),  despite  the  acknowledged  importance  of   6 
government to MNEs (Brewer, 1992; Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Ring, Lenway and Govekar, 1990). 
Because MNEs are subject to the authorities of multiple sources of sovereignty, Sundaram and Black 
(1992) suggest politics is an essential area for international business.  Vernon’s (1971) early work in the 
area suggests MNEs have strong incentives to influence host country government policies on an on-going 
basis  to  safeguard  their  often  substantial  investments,  particularly  given  the  threat  of  repatriation  of 
earnings, immigration laws, trade laws and investment laws.   Grosse and Behrman argue that theories 
that fail to incorporate the political activities of MNEs take the “national” out of “inter-national” and 
leave the analysis “as a simple extension of firm and market theories” (1992: 97).  Similarly, Dunning 
(1993) asserts that any theory of MNE activity that does not seek to understand and explain the role of 
governments, not just as another variable, but like the market as an organizational entity is bound to be 
deficient.  Thus, the role of politics for MNEs and more specifically corporate political strategies, defined 
as proactive actions to affect the public policy environment in a way favorable to the firm (Baysinger, 
1984), is indisputably an important aspect of international business.  
Much of the research on international business and politics has focused on MNE-host government 
negotiations at the time of initial entry into a country (e.g. Dunning, 1992; Fagre & Wells, 1982; Grosse, 
1996; Kim, 1988; Vernon, 1971).  This is perhaps not surprising given the attention paid to entry modes 
within  the  international  business  literature.    Jean  Boddewyn’s  work  served  as  a  catalyst  for  further 
understanding  of  MNE  political  strategies  beyond  entry  negotiations.    While  much  of  IB  literature 
categorizes political environments as ‘risks’ to factor into planning, Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) argue 
that governments represent opportunities for MNEs as well.  This perspective helped shape the focus of 
current research on the strategies used by MNEs to affect opportunities in host and home governments.  
For example, a large body of research has focused on protectionism from foreign competition and the 
gains to domestic firms (e.g. Boddewyn, 1975, 1993; Rugman & Verbeke, 1993; Moran, 1985; Eden & 
Molot, 2002). 
Recently,  Hillman,  Keim  and  Schuler  (2004)  reviewed  the  literature  in  corporate  political 
strategies  and  identified  four  levels  of  antecedents:  firm  level  (including  firm  size,  dependence  on   7 
government, risk, slack, diversification, internal structures and management support, and foreign versus 
domestic  ownership),  industry  level  (including  industry  concentration,  number  of  firms  and  level  of 
competition), issue specific (including salience of the issue and level of competition to affect the issue) 
and institutional level (including formal and informal institutions). Of particular interest to IB scholars 
was  the  relative  lack  of  development  regarding  the  institutional  antecedents  of  corporate  political 
strategies.  
Although a great deal of recent literature in the area is preoccupied with the domestic context in 
the United States, or a single regional context such as the European Union (e.g. Coen, 1997; Cowles, 
2001),  a  few  notable  papers  do  examine  MNE  strategies  across  countries  and/or  how  institutional 
differences affect business-government relations.  For example, Hillman and Keim (1995) model how 
institutional  differences  create  different  public  policy  outcomes  and  competitive  situations  for  firms.  
Blumentritt (2003) examines how the bargaining power of MNE subsidiaries along with host country 
characteristics affect the choice of political strategies; whereas Hillman and Hitt (1999) model how a 
country’s degree of corporatism versus pluralism, along with firm, industry and issue variables, affect the 
choice of MNE strategy.  Finally, Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Wan (2004) seek to understand the 
relative effects of firm/subsidiary antecedents and institutional antecedents of political strategies, finding 
that  both  exhibit  a  strong  influence  on  the  actions  taken  by  MNE  subsidiaries  to  influence  host 
governments.  Thus,  scholars  are  beginning  to  provide  for  an  understanding  of  how  institutional 
differences affect MNE-government interactions.   
Scholars  interested  in  corporate  political  strategies  have  adopted  a  variety  of  theoretical 
frameworks. Table 1 reflects these trends within the literature and points to the variety of applicable 
perspectives and insights within the field. As portrayed, the theoretical bases for work in this area run the 
gamut from Industrial Organization Economics to the Resource-Based View, to Resource-Dependence, to 
Institutional Theory to Political Economy to Cooperative Strategies. In some cases the application of 
specific theoretical lenses (e.g. Resource-Based View and Cooperative Strategies) reflects the emergence 
of these views within related disciplines near the same time, yet other theories seem to be “mainstays” of   8 
work in the area.  
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
---------------------- 
 
Corruption and the multinational enterprise  
Prior to the pronounced changes that accompanied the globalization of business in the 1980s and 
1990s, research on corruption and its relationship to firms’ activities was almost non-existent. As foreign 
firms expanded into, and new firms were born within, developing and transition economies governments, 
managers and scholars grew more aware of the magnitude of corruption and the need to understand and 
address it. Fortunately, researchers from many social science disciplines have begun to fill this deficit. 
Research on corruption has grown quickly over the past decade, answering some fundamental questions 
and highlighting the importance of many more.  Now, many fundamental questions about corruption have 
been thoughtfully addressed, including the most basic question, ‘what is corruption?’  Corruption is most 
commonly defined as the misuse of public power for private gain,  but more general definitions substitute  
the word ‘authority’ for public power to include corruption that arises strictly between private parties  
(Svensson, 2005).   
Scholars  interested  in  corruption  and  international  business  have  pursued  questions  on  these 
subjects  through  a  variety  of  theoretical  frameworks  including  industrial  economics  views,  resource-
dependence, and institutional theory.  Table 2 notes selected works that span these trends within the 
literature, highlight the variety of applicable perspectives on corruption and point the way for future 
contributions.  The literature on corruption has drawn from  many of the social sciences.   Generally, 
scholars within each of these disciplines have tried to integrate or address the views and objectives of 
different  academic  fields.    Nevertheless,  each  field  has  tended  to  center  its  questions  on  a  few  key 
questions about corruption with little attention to some of the more intriguing interrelationships among 
MNEs, policymakers and local populations.  Consequently, IB research on corruption retains a healthy 
agenda of questions to be addressed based on the strong, extant works from sister disciplines but targeting   9 
the richer, cross-disciplinary issues that speak directly to MNEs.  
---------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
---------------------- 
 
Owing  to  the  circumstances  that  prompted  interest  in  corruption,  most  scholars  focused 
exclusively  on  government  corruption  and  issues  directly  related  to  economic  opening.    Early  on, 
researchers  established  corruption’s  deterrent  effects  on  growth  (Mauro,  1995)  and  foreign  direct 
investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Wei 2000), in most circumstances, and had raised the question 
of  when  corruption mattered and  whether it might attract investment flows (Henisz, 2000).   Related 
efforts focused on identifying the root causes, or at least root correlates, of corruption.  In most of these 
studies, (see Husted (1999), Treisman (2000) and Robertson and Watson (2004)), measures of corruption 
are best predicted by GDP per capita, measures of regulatory barriers and cultural characteristics, such as 
high power distance. More generally, scholars have found that the government regulation of entry into 
new markets, whether by foreign or domestic firms, is associated with higher levels of bribery and corrupt 
exchanges  (Djankov  et  al.  2003).    Such  a  finding  --  that  regulation  can  lead  to  circumvention  by 
bureaucrats and firms -- comports with the view that corruption is principally a feature of mismanaged 
and  obtrusive  governments  (Mauro,  1998).    This  same  view  bolstered  support  for  the  Washington 
Consensus, the well-known recommended set of policy reforms for newly open economies, and suggested 
that corruption would fade with increased market liberalization.  To the contrary, corruption has endured 
despite increased openness, prompting interest in questions that centered on how to respond to corruption 
rather than what caused it. 
More recently, research on corruption has centered on firms’ engagement with and responses to 
corruption.  Indeed this is an area that distinguishes IB and management scholarship on corruption since 
the other social sciences have not sought to answer such questions.  Doh et al. (2003) describe various 
channels through which corruption affects firms and offer a set of prescriptions for managing in corrupt 
environments. For all that has been learned about corruption in recent years, the question of how firms 
should manage in the face of it continues to be among the most important and elusive.  Rodriguez et al.   10 
(2005) addresses part of this question by deriving a two-dimensional framework for describing corrupt 
environments.  In accentuating the differences among corrupt environments, the authors draw attention to 
the variable nature of corruption and the need to address corruption with different strategies in different 
markets.   
Earlier Campos et al. (1999) and Wei (2000) had found that aggregate investment flows were 
slowed by the variability in the demand for bribes so the nature of corruption had already been established 
as a meaningful issue.  Still, it was not yet clear that firms adapted to corruption other than through 
market  avoidance.    While  it  seems  reasonable  that  firms  would  implement  strategies  to  deal  with 
corruption, this has not been easy to establish.  Nevertheless, Smarzynska and Wei (2000) did find that 
higher  levels  of  corruption  in  Eastern  European  countries  increased  the  likelihood  of  entry  via  joint 
venture.  Similarly Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that firms engage in short-term management contracts 
and joint ventures in response to high levels and high arbitrariness of corruption.  Little else has been 
established regarding firm strategies for dealing with corruption or how firm’s actions may influence the 
corrupt environment, but this remains a fruitful area for future research. 
 
Corporate social responsibility and the multinational enterprise  
  Of the three lenses on the multinational enterprise, the literature on multinationals and CSR is the 
most embryonic.  In part, this is because CSR is difficult to define, especially in the context of MNEs.  
Such firms operate in diverse environments and cultures, and thus, are more likely to encounter numerous 
stakeholder groups and NGOs.   
  Consistent with McWilliams and Siegel (2001), we define CSR as instances where the company 
goes beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to advance a social cause.   Such actions 
might include adding social features or characteristics to products or modifying production processes to 
signify that the firm is seeking to advance a social objective (e.g., selling cosmetics with ingredients that 
are not tested on animals or adopting environmentally-friendly technologies) or working closely with 
community organizations to ameliorate homelessness and indigence (e.g., the Society of St. Vincent De   11 
Paul).  In an international context, CSR may also involve avoiding operations in countries that commit 
human rights violations.   
  Indeed, the most commonly studied CSR ‘event’ was divestment from South Africa, an issue that 
was exclusively encountered by  MNEs.   This issue  provides a useful illustration of the difficulty in 
defining CSR.  Most observers assumed that, for MNEs, divestment from South Africa was a socially 
responsible action.  However, Wright and Ferris (1997) challenged this notion, by pointing out that black 
workers and other stakeholders may have suffered when American firms withdrew from South Africa, 
because the firms that divested had been especially supportive of these employees (especially, relative to 
other domestic companies).  
Most CSR studies assess the relationship between a firm’s social performance and its financial 
performance. Once again, this question is most relevant to MNEs, since these enterprises are more likely 
to  be  publicly  traded,  highly  visible  to  ‘activists’  and  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs),  and 
therefore, vulnerable to pressure to enhance social performance.  These results have been mixed, with 
some authors reporting no relationship (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), a positive relationship (Waddock & 
Graves, 1997), and a negative relationship (Wright & Ferris, 1997).  Although authors of recent meta 
analyses (Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky,  Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003) claim that there is strong 
empirical evidence supporting the existence of a positive link between social and financial performance, 
these studies do not address the severe methodological flaws unearthed in critiques of event studies of 
CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; McWilliams, Siegel, and Teoh, 1999) and regression analyses of 
CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).   
 A  study  by  Hillman  and  Keim  (2001)  provided  a  novel  twist  to  this  debate.    The  authors 
suggested that when assessing the ‘returns’ to CSR it was critical to discriminate between ‘stakeholder 
management’  CSR  and  ‘social’  CSR.  This  is  consistent  with  Baron’s  (2001)  distinction  between 
‘altruistic’ and ‘strategic’ CSR. More specifically, the authors concluded that while stakeholder-oriented 
CSR was positively correlated with financial performance, social CSR was not.   
A recent positive development in the CSR literature has been the attempt to relate CSR to more   12 
conventional theories of strategy and industrial organization.  These papers are summarized in Table 3. 
Similarly, there is growing interest among managers in the antecedents and outcomes of CSR, especially 
for executives at multi-national, multi-divisional companies.  These corporate leaders are mindful of the 
fact that business norms  and standards, regulatory frameworks and political systems,  corruption, and 
stakeholder demand for CSR can vary substantially across nations, regions, and lines of business.  They 
are also aware that their divisional managers  are under constant pressure  from employees, suppliers, 
community groups, NGOs, and government to increase their involvement in CSR.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
  Hart  (1995)  and  Russo  and  Fouts  (1997)  were  the  first  to  apply  strategic  theories  to  social 
responsibility.  Hart conjectured that environmental social responsibility could result in the creation of a 
resource or capability that leads to sustained competitive advantage.  Russo and Fouts (1997) provided 
empirical support for this hypothesis by reporting that there was a positive correlation at the firm level 
between environmental performance and financial performance.   
  Building on this RBV framework, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) outlined a formal theory-of-the-
firm model of ‘profit-maximizing’ CSR.  These authors conjectured that the provision of CSR can best be 
understood from a supply and demand perspective.   They assumed that firms weighed the costs and 
benefits of engaging in this activity.  Some of these benefits included a greater ability to differentiate 
products, reputation/image enhancement, the use of CSR to recruit and retain high quality workers, and 
maintaining good relations with key stakeholders (e.g., employees, government, and investors).  
  A crucial implication of a theory of the firm perspective on CSR is that there should be a positive 
correlation between CSR and proxies for product differentiation, such as research and development and 
advertising (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).  Such an assertion highlights the importance of information 
asymmetry in the context of CSR.  It is important to note that consumers and other stakeholders often find 
it difficult to determine if a firm’s internal operations meet their moral and political standards for socially 
responsibility.  The level of asymmetric information regarding internal operations can be mediated by the   13 
firm itself or by activists.  For instance, companies such as McDonalds, Motorola, and Nike publish 
annual reports on social responsibility.  One can view this activity as a form of advertising, especially for 
more  general  types  of  CSR.      While  such  reports  may  be  useful,  some  consumers  perceive  this 
information as biased, since it is filtered through senior management.   Fedderson &  Gilligan (2001) 
asserted, for example, that activists can play an important role in addressing this concern, by supplying 
consumers with information they can rely on to choose socially responsible firms.   
In order to achieve and sustain a competitive advantage, firms can use CSR in conjunction with a 
political strategy that harms its competitors.  For example, companies can use government regulation and 
CSR to raise rivals’ costs. Howard Marvel (1977) provided an excellent illustration of such a strategy: the 
case of the British textile industry in the early nineteenth century.  The first child labor law was passed in 
Great Britain after the mill owners who employed modern technology banded together and lobbied for 
restrictions  on  child  labor,  which  was  used  more  by  the  older,  smaller  mills.    In  a  similar  vein, 
McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory (2002) showed how U.S. firms can use CSR-based political strategies 
to heighten regulatory  entry barriers that prevent  foreign competitors from employing an alternative, 
lower-cost, production process. 
 
Research agenda  
Politics and the multinational enterprise 
  In their recent review of literature on corporate political strategies, Hillman, Keim and Schuler 
(2004) provided insight into the ‘state of the field’ regarding antecedents of, typologies of, methods of 
organizing for, and outcomes of corporate political strategies. Although their review was internationally 
focused, the paucity of relevant work regarding MNEs represents an opportunity for IB scholars.  While 
research interested in antecedents of political strategies within any single country can ignore institutional 
effects, to have a more complete view  we need far  more research on the dimensions of institutional 
variation relevant to the choice and effectiveness of corporate political strategies.  In addition, when 
shifting focus to MNEs, the trend begun by Blumentritt and colleagues (Blumentritt, 2003; Blumentritt &   14 
Nigh,  2002)  and  Hillman  and  colleagues  (Hillman,  2003;  Hillman  &  Wan,  2004)  to  examine  the 
subsidiary level of analysis must continue if we are to have a more complete understanding of MNE-
political action.  That is, it is no longer sufficient to examine antecedents at the firm, industry, issue and 
institutional level without consideration of the unique characteristics of each subsidiary that engages in 
political action.  
  IB scholars may also find opportunity in questioning or testing for the applicability of existing 
typologies  of  corporate  political  strategies  across  countries.    Is  it  the  case  that  the  same  actions  are 
considered no matter what the context? How do local norms regarding political behavior, corruption and 
social responsibility affect these choices  and action  types?   Are the  methods for organizing political 
efforts within domestic firms transferable to MNEs or does this unique organization form require its own 
models of organization?  Finally, how do the outcomes of political strategies differ based on context? 
  In terms of integrating these opportunities with those within the CSR and corruption areas, how do 
the three interact to affect firms’ strategic use of CSR, the effects of corruption on MNE operations, and 
corporate  political  strategies?    By  integrating  across  these  three  lenses,  we  may  uncover  richer 
opportunities for advancement than by continuing to operate in relative silos.    
 
Corruption and the multinational enterprise 
In a recent article, Svennson (2005) surveyed the economic literature to address eight questions
1 
on corruption.  The eight questions cover some of the most important areas of research on corruption, but 
they leave open many relevant and substantive issues.  Among the most basic questions that remain to be 
addressed  are  issues  that  have  hidden  behind  the  macro-level  data  typical  of  extant  research.    A 
particularly  important  issue  is  the incidence  of  corruption.     Svensson  (2003)  takes  on  this  question 
squarely but far more is needed to learn whether the need to pay bribes is most influenced by the firm, 
individual,  or  industry  characteristics,  by  geographic  region,  or  management  practices.    Similarly, 
scholars have not had much to say regarding strategies for avoiding or managing corruption or regarding 
which managers are disposed to engagement with corruption and why.  One of the most discouraging   15 
facets  of  corruption  is  its  persistence  and  the  limited  successes  of  anticorruption  campaigns.  
Understanding corruption at the individual level - who engages in corruption, why they do so and how 
their  social  networks  foster  corruption,  is  vital  to  any  effort  to  understand  and  limit  corruption.  
Surprisingly,  most  of  what  we  know  about  corruption  has  almost  nothing  directly  to  do  with  the 
individuals who engage in it. 
As  with  other  literatures,  scholarship  on  corruption  would  benefit  from  more  attention  to 
definitions.  Corruption is still most commonly defined to preclude private corruption though it is clear 
that both government corruption and private corruption often go hand in hand and stem from the same 
underlying institutions.  Moreover, an understanding of private corruption is vital to any assessment of the 
role of business in society and of the effects of firms on the environment of corruption.  Concepts like 
self-dealing (Djankov et al. 2005) and tunneling - the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of those who control them, (La Porta et al. 2000) deserve a more central place in the IB research 
agenda on corruption.  Finally, most studies of corruption consider transactions that are plainly illegal and 
which are most conspicuous in low-income, developing economies.  Yet, it is not clear when corruption 
coincides with, or differs from, influence over policies, which is considered lobbying and is considered a 
political strategy in high-income nations.  Some guideposts exist, such as the difference between changing 
rules for all firms (i.e. lobbying) and breaking/bending them a la carte (i.e. corruption),  but in many 
cases, there is no bright line between political influence that is considered lobbying in one context and 
exchanges that qualify as corruption in another. These are fruitful areas for IB scholarship. 
 
Corporate social responsibility and the multinational enterprise 
There  are  numerous  unresolved  theoretical  and  empirical  issues  relating  to  the  strategic 
implications of CSR for MNEs.  These include defining CSR, identifying institutional differences in CSR 
across  countries,  determining  the  motivations  for  CSR,  describing  CSR  domestic  and  multi-national 
strategies, modeling the effects of CSR on the firm and stakeholder groups, determining the effects of 
leadership and corporate culture on CSR activity, assessing the effect of CSR on the firm and stakeholder   16 
groups, measuring the demand for CSR, measuring the costs of CSR and assessing the current knowledge 
base.    
Theoretical issues to be resolved  
There is no strong consensus on a definition for CSR.  CSR has been used as a synonym for 
business ethics, defined as tantamount to corporate philanthropy, and considered strictly as relating to 
environmental policy.  CSR has also been confused with corporate social performance and corporate 
citizenship.    This  lack  of  consistency  makes  it  difficult  to  compare  results  across  CSR  studies  and 
hampers our ability to understand the implications of CSR.  Having a good definition of CSR, with a 
common  terminology,  would  aid  in  modeling  the  role  of  organizational  culture  and  leadership  in 
explaining the antecedents and consequences of this activity.   
Researchers  could  analyze  how  changes  in  corporate  control,  particularly  through  merger  or 
acquisition,  affect  the  type  and  level  of  CSR  activity  within  firms.    Alternatively,  changes  in  top 
management (CEO or team) might be examined to determine whether leadership style and characteristics 
are more important than corporate control/culture for predicting CSR activity.  Understanding the role of 
leadership could be extended to understanding the decision making process and how decisions about CSR 
activity are affected by demands from multiple stakeholders.      
  Asymmetric information makes it difficult to study the antecedents and consequences of CSR.  
Managers  may  perceive  that  many  external  stakeholders  view  CSR  activity  more  favorably  if  it  is 
divorced from any discussion of the bottom line.  With this in mind, managers may not reveal the more 
practical motivations (such as product promotion, labor cost control and reputation building) behind their 
CSR  activities,  especially  in  corporate  publications  such  as  annual  reports.    This  lack  of  candid 
information has made it difficult to distinguish and discuss the different motivations for CSR, which may 
be private or social.   
  The use of CSR to capture value is referred to as strategic CSR by Baron (2001) who points out 
that  “it  is  the  motivation  for  the  action  that  identifies  socially,  as  opposed  to  privately,  responsible 
action.”    That  is,  if  the  motivation  is  to  serve  society,  at  the  cost  of  profits,  the  action  is  socially   17 
responsible, but if the motivation is to serve the ‘bottom line’, then the action is privately responsible.  
For privately responsible actions, there may well be social benefits that exceed the cost of the action to 
the firm.  However, this does not change the motivation, unless these social benefits are of value to 
managers.  For example, providing day care may lower the number of juvenile crimes in a community, 
but the firm might provide the day care only because it increases the availability of workers and lowers 
the cost of absenteeism.   
  In  addition  to  understanding  the  motivation  for  the  provision  of  social  benefits,  we  need  to 
understand how the provision of these goods, through strategic CSR, affects society.  An example of 
strategic CSR is when a firm links the provision of a public good to the sale of their (private) products 
(e.g., eco-labeling).  Analysis of the provision of public goods by private firms is a welcome addition to 
the management literature on CSR, which has been primarily focused on the following question: “Do 
firms ‘do well by doing good’?” Showing that a firm does well by doing good is often referred to as 
“making the business case for CSR”.  While understanding the relation between firm performance and 
social performance is of primary importance in the management literature, a more thorough understanding 
of the CSR phenomenon requires that we take account of other stakeholders as well.  These stakeholders 
include:  customers,  employees,  governments,  suppliers,  taxpayers,  community  groups,  and 
underrepresented groups.   
  Assessment  of  the  strategic  implications  of  CSR  is  hampered  by  cross-country/cultural 
differences in the institutions that regulate market activity, including business, labor and social agencies.  
Institutional  differences  lead  to  different  expectations  and  different  returns  to  activity.    For  firms 
operating in multiple countries/cultures this complicates the process of determining which activities to 
engage in and how much to invest.  As the knowledge base of CSR develops world-wide, we will be 
better able to analyze and advise on CSR. We now turn out attention to empirical research.  
Empirical issues to be resolved 
  Problems with measurement of the costs and benefits of CSR activities continue to cloud our 
understanding of the strategic implications of CSR.  A major impediment to empirical research is the   18 
continuing confusion over definition that we mentioned above.  It is impossible to measure what we 
cannot  define  and,  as  long  as  we  use  different  definitions,  we  will  get  empirical  results  that  cannot 
reliably be compared.   
As noted earlier, most papers focus on the relation between CSR and firm performance.  Early 
studies used either the event study methodology (which is based on analysis of short-run changes in stock 
prices as a proxy for firm performance in the aftermath of a CSR-related event) or regression analysis 
(which uses an accounting measure of profitability, such as return on assets, as the dependent variable in a 
regression  model  that  “explains”  firm  performance).    These  studies  usually  attempted  to  answer  the 
question: do firms do well by doing good?  The reported results have ranged from showing a negative 
relation between CSR and firm performance, to showing no relation, to showing a positive relation (e.g. 
the results of divesting from South Africa shown in Table 3).  There is little consistency in these findings.  
This  may  be  a  result  of  inconsistency  in  defining  CSR,  inconsistency  in  defining  firm  performance, 
inconsistency in samples, imprecision and inconsistency in research design, misspecification of models, 
changes over time, or some more fundamental variance in the samples that are being analyzed.  
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) provide a framework for analyzing CSR within the context of the 
theory of the firm.  Based on this framework, they developed hypotheses regarding the provision of CSR 
attributes across industries and market structures.  They hypothesized that “the provision of CSR will 
depend on R&D spending, advertising intensity, the extent of product differentiation, the percentage of 
government sales, consumer income, the tightness of the labor market, and the stage of the industry life 
cycle”  (2001,  p.  125).    All  of  these  should  be  tested  empirically  to  see  if  the  results  support  the 
hypotheses. 
 
Overview of the Focused Issue  
  The  theoretical  and  empirical  issues  discussed  above  provide  an  important  foundation  for 
understanding  the  contributions  of  the  articles  in  this  special  issue.    These  papers  shed  light  on  the 
definitional issues that plague this research, and demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, how   19 
making clear, specific definitions can result in deeper understanding and guide more rigorous research on 
CSR, corruption, and corporate political strategies.  
  We turn now to reviewing the papers in the Focused Issue. We followed the process established by 
Editor-in-Chief Arie Lewin for JIBS Focused Issues, whereby one JIBS departmental editor (Lorraine 
Eden) works with a team of guest editors (Amy Hillman, Peter Rodriguez and Donald Siegel). After 
issuing an open Call for Papers, we received 70 manuscripts.  These papers were peer reviewed according 
to  standard  JIBS  editorial  practices.  The  authors  of  12  papers  that  received  first-round  revise-and-
resubmit decisions were invited to present their papers at a JIBS Focused Issue Workshop, which was 
held at the School of Global Management and Leadership at Arizona State University in January 2006.  
Nine papers  were presented and  critiqued by assigned discussants at the  workshop; the other papers 
continued through the regular JIBS review process. Jean Boddewyn and John Dunning were excellent 
rapporteurs, providing useful insights that spanned across the papers.  Afterwards, a second round of 
decision letters were set to the workshop authors, either conditionally accepting the papers, requesting 
further revisions, or rejecting the manuscripts. Following additional revisions, the editors selected the 
final papers that appear in this Focused Issue.  
 
Politics and the multinational enterprise  
  The paper by Yadong Luo seeks to integrate corporate political strategies and interactions within 
the context of corporate social responsibility and corruption.  This is perhaps the most ambitious study 
within the Focused Issue for it truly crosses over and combines all three lenses on the MNE using a 
structuration approach.  Adopting the differentiation between cooperative and assertive approaches to 
MNE-host government interactions, he models how each choice is related to elements of the firm’s CSR 
and perceived corruption in the environment.  He proposes that an MNE’s propensity to cooperate with a 
host  government  is  related  to  its  philanthropic  contribution  and  resource  accommodation;  while  its 
propensity  to  be  assertive  with  the  host  government  is  associated  with  its  emphasis  on  ethics  and 
organizational credibility. Similarly, when MNEs perceive corruption in the environment, Luo argues that   20 
the MNE’s propensity to cooperate and be assertive decreases, its focus on  ethics heightens, and its 
philanthropic  contribution  diminishes.  Finally,  Luo  models  and  tests  three-way  interactions  between 
politics, CSR and perceived corruption to show the complex inter-relationships among these aspects of 
the business-society relationship.   
  Luo’s  analysis of sample  MNEs in China generally  supports these propositions. He finds an 
MNE’s  propensity  to  cooperate  with  a  host  government  is  negatively  associated  with  perceived 
corruption,  and  that  adherence  to  codes  of  ethics  is  positive  and  philanthropy  negatively  related  to 
perceived corruption. Politics and CSR are also interrelated such that MNEs that are more assertive with 
governments tend to emphasize ethical codes, while MNEs that are more cooperative with governments 
tend  to  be  more  committed  to  philanthropic  and  resource  contributions.  He  also  uncovers  interesting 
relationships between political strategies, corruption and CSR activities within his sample.  While an 
initial step into the complexity of interaction between politics, CSR and corruption, Luo’s paper provides 
evidence of how fruitful integration across the lenses can be for future research. 
 
Corruption and the multinational enterprise 
Chuck Kwok and Solomon Tadesse take a fresh look at the relationship between firms and 
corruption  focusing  on  the  effects  of  firms  and  their  investments  on  the  environment  of  corruption.  
Tackling this question is no easy task given data constraints and confounding effects, but Kwok and 
Tadesse conduct of wide variety of tests to establish the robustness of their results.  They find that current 
corruption levels are significantly lower in countries with high FDI flows in the past.  This central result 
holds for FDI flows lagged by as much as thirty years.   
Additionally, the authors find that the harmful effects of culture on corruption are lower and the 
beneficial effects of education on corruption are higher in countries with higher FDI in the past.  Their 
results are robust to omitted variables bias, controls for host-country characteristics, including the level of 
economic  development,  political  tradition,  education,  culture,  legal  system,  religious  orientation  and 
institutional development.  The general findings, which support the idea that FDI influences the host   21 
country environment of corruption, speak to fundamental questions in IB and support related research 
efforts regarding the specific channels of influence through which firms influence society.  
  Utz Weitzel and Sjors Berns consider a previously untested effect of corruption on cross-border 
and  domestic  takeover  premia.    In  addition  to  the  value  of  the  paper’s  direct  message,  the  authors’ 
findings shed light on the nature of corruption’s effect on FDI flows.  It is well known that corruption is 
associated with reduced flows of FDI, but Weitzel and Berns show that the effects do not just prevent 
entry by some firms, but also lower valuations for acquired ownership shares.  More directly, Weitzel and 
Berns examine 4,979 cross-border and domestic takeovers and find that, after correcting for governance 
and related factors, corruption markedly reduces target premiums. Extrapolating from their findings, the 
authors estimate that a one point deterioration in a country’s ranking on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index is, on average, associated with a reduction of 21% for local target premia.  
Moreover, the result holds for both foreign and domestic acquirers, suggesting that local corruption is not 
just a barrier for foreign firms, but rather a source of lost value for all firms.   
  Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra refines our understanding of effects of corruption on the composition of 
investment flows and highlights important new questions regarding the long-term effects of corruption.  
Among the first important questions about corruption was whether it deterred or fostered FDI, principally 
from  multinational  enterprises.    While  it  is  well  understood  that  corruption  has  many  effects  on 
investment flows and that it almost always deters them, the literature has not clearly shown whether 
corruption’s effects on FDI differ across nations, whether anti-corruption norms or laws seem effective, 
and how the composition of investment flows may matter.   
  Cuervo-Cazurra examines bilateral FDI flows from 183 home economies to 106 host economies 
and finds that corruption deters FDI from some countries but fails to deter, or even attracts FDI flows 
from others.  Whether the source of the variation in the effects of corruption of the origin of FDI flows 
stems  from  cultural  distance,  experience  with  corruption  or  from  anti-corruption  laws  or  norms,  the 
outcome and the implications for firms and nations are significant.  Cuervo-Cazurra’s results show that 
the proportion of FDI flows from countries with low levels of corruption and anti-corruption laws is   22 
decreasing in a host country’s level of corruption.  Thus, host countries with high levels of corruption 
must contend with reduced flows of FDI and any effects that result from the increased proportion of FDI 
flows from home countries with high corruption.  An appreciation how corruption matters for investment 
and for which firms and nations is a valuable contribution to the literature and accentuates the challenges 
of reducing corruption in environments where it is relatively high.  
 
Corporate social responsibility and the multinational enterprise 
David  Waldman,  Mary  Sully  de  Luque,  Nathan  Washburn  and  Robert  House  pose  an 
interesting research question, especially in light of our previous discussion of the strategic implications of 
CSR for  MNEs.   The authors examine  whether country-specific cultural factors and CEO leadership 
characteristics are associated with the CSR values of top management team members.  They focus their 
attention  on  two  cultural  dimensions:  institutional  collectivism  and  power  distance.    Institutional 
collectivism is defined as the extent to which a society rewards and emphasizes collective action and 
resource distribution, as well as group performance and rewards.  Power distance refers to the degree to 
which individuals in a given country believe in an unequal distribution of power.  A high power distance 
culture is one in which the hierarchy between superiors and subordinates is extensive, customary, and 
legitimate.  
Their  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  data  from  the  Global  Leadership  and  Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness or GLOBE project (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).  The 
GLOBE  data  contain  information  on  cultural  variables  and  CSR  values  for  561  firms  located  in  15 
countries on five continents.  The authors find that institutional collectivism and power distance, as well 
as CEO visionary leadership and integrity, are strong predictors of CSR values.   
Bryan  Husted  and  David  Allen  assess  the  relationship  between  global  CSR  and  local  or 
country-specific  CSR  and  international  organizational  strategy.    This  is  another  useful  extension  of 
theoretical and empirical research on the strategic aspects of CSR to MNEs.  A novel twist of the paper is 
that it applies the strategic logic of the Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) to the domain of CSR.  Bartlett and   23 
Ghoshal (1989) developed a typology of MNEs (multidomestic, transnational, and global), which implies 
that MNEs should respond to the competing pressures for global integration and local responsiveness to 
key stakeholders. On the other hand, institutional theory implies that MNEs will adopt the same product-
market  organizational  strategy  (multidomestic,  transnational,  global)  for  their  CSR  activities.  Thus, 
Husted and Allen essentially provide a test of whether institutional theory or a specific type of strategic 
theory of CSR has more explanatory power with respect to MNE behavior.  
Their  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  firm-level  dataset  of  MNEs  operating  in  Mexico.    In 
contrast to some of the empirical work cited earlier, they find that institutional pressures, rather than 
strategic factors, have greater explanatory power with respect to MNE   Another key finding of their study 
is that each type of MNE appears to perceive global CSR issues (e.g., environmental social responsibility) 
as being important. However, multi-domestic and transnational MNEs emphasize country-specific CSR 
more than global MNEs do.  Thus, consistent with institutional theory, it appears that CSR may conform 
to MNE organization strategies adopted for product market activities.    
Vanessa  Strike,  Jijun  Gao  and  Pratima  Bansal  suggest  that  firms  can  simultaneously  be 
socially responsible and socially irresponsible.  A good example of this phenomenon is Philip Morris, 
which is actively involved in social responsibility, while also producing a product (tobacco products) that 
most individuals perceive to be socially irresponsible.  Based on the RBV framework, the authors also 
assess whether international diversification affects the propensity of firms to be socially responsible and 
socially irresponsible.  Specifically, they assert that firms diversifying internationally create value by 
acting responsibly and destroy value by acting irresponsibly.   Their empirical evidence, which is based 
on data from 222 U.S. firms, is consistent with each of these assertions.  
  Petra Christmann and Glen Taylor assess the factors that influence firm-level decisions by 
MNEs to be environmentally socially responsible and the extent of “investment” in this activity.  The 
specific type of environmental social responsibility that is analyzed is ISO 9000, a set of international 
certifiable management standards.  An interesting aspect of this activity is that it constitutes a governance 
mechanism  for  environmental  self-regulation  and  therefore,  can  be  a  means  of  forestalling  additional   24 
environmental regulation.  This, of course, raises the specter that firms may engage in this activity for strategic 
reasons.   
  The authors conjecture that adopters strategically choose their level of compliance depending on 
customer  preferences,  customer  monitoring,  and  expected  sanctions  by  customers.    Their  empirical 
analysis, which is based on data from ISO certified firms in China, is consistent with view.  These data 
also allow the authors to distinguish between substantive implementation and symbolic implementation.  
The key results are that suppliers are more likely to choose substantive implementation, as opposed to 
symbolic  implementation,  if  customers  place  high  importance  on  an  issue,  monitor  their  suppliers 
directly, possess monitoring capabilities, and do not rely on third-party certification in selecting their 
suppliers.  They also report that the likelihood and cost of sanctions contributes to substantive standard 
implementation by suppliers.  
 
Conclusions: Lessons and new directions 
Multinational enterprises operate locally in multiple countries around the world and globally as 
an  international  organization.  As  local  residents,  they  must  respond  to  each  country’s  rules  and 
institutions,  adapt  to  diverse  socioeconomic  conditions,  and  respond  to  multiple  stakeholders.  Not 
surprisingly, from time to time, the goals and activities of MNEs come into conflict with local or national 
requirements or expectations. Relations between international business and local society, by definition, 
are multi-layered and complex, fraught with potential pitfalls and tensions (Eden and Lenway, 2001). At 
the same time, international institutions such as the OECD and United Nations are pressuring MNEs to 
adopt harmonized or common standards of conduct in areas such as anti-bribery, taxation, environment, 
and corporate social responsibility.  The purpose of this Focused Issue was to explore the commonalities 
and differences in MNE-societal relations through the three lenses of politics, corruption and corporate 
social responsibility. We hope that this project contributes to and stimulates further work by international 

















View of the Firm  
Political competencies such as better intelligence about, 
access to, bargaining skills, and coalition building, 
important to competitive advantage. 
Boddewyn (1988)  





The government should be added as a “sixth force” within 
Porter’s Five Forces model and political strategy a new 
“generic” 





Differences in institutional arrangements (both formal and 
informal institutions) affect nature of business-government 
interactions. 
Mahon & McGowan 
(1998) Bonardi, 





The “attractiveness” of political markets can be modeled 
using similar tools to Porter’s Five Forces. 
Hillman & Keim 
(1995)  
Bonardi, Hillman & 
Keim (2005) 
Political economy  Public policy arenas in non-totalitarian regimes can be 
conceived of as a market with demanders and suppliers 
Luo (2001)  Cooperative 
Strategies 
MNE-host government relations as cooperation. 
McWilliams, Van 
Fleet & Cory (2002) 
Resource-Based 
View 
Raising rivals’ cost through political strategy can affect 
competitive advantage in the market. 
Hillman (2003) 





Both firm level (RBV) and institutional level (institutional 
theory) affect the choice of MNE political strategies. 
Blumentritt (2003)  Resource-
dependence theory 
Dependence of MNE subsidiary on host country 
government and other factors will affect choice of political 
strategies. 
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OLI Paradigm  FDI flows into a country are reduced by the difference in 
measured levels of corruption between home and host 
country. 
Wei (2000)  Theory of the Firm  Variations in measured levels of corruption reduce FDI 
levels by as much or more than variations in corporate tax 
rates. 
Henisz (2000)  Transaction Cost 
Economics 
Both entry decisions and the level of ownership are 
influenced by the ‘unexpected’ level of corruption, which 
may increase foreign entry. 
Husted (1999)  Theory of the Firm 
and Institutional 
Theory  
Cultural characteristics and level of development explain 
variations in country-level measures of corruption  
Djankov et al. 
(2002) 
Theory of the Firm  Corruption results from the burdens of state regulation of 
the entry/creation of new firms and coincides with the 
existence and growth of the informal economy 
Doh et al. (2003)  Institutional Theory 
and Transaction 
Cost Economics 
Firms employ a variety of strategies, from market 
avoidance and adaptation of entry mode to social 
contributions and political strategies, to cope with the level 
and nature of local corruption.  
Rodriguez et al. 
(2005) 
Uhlenbruck et al. 
(2006) 
Institutional Theory  The nature of corruption determines firms’ strategic 
choices.  The entry mode choice is influenced by local 
corruption’s pervasiveness (i.e. the likelihood of likelihood 
of encountering corruption) and arbitrariness (i.e. the 
inherent degree of ambiguity associated with corrupt 
transactions).   
Smarzynska and 
Wei (2000) 
Theory of the Firm  Corruption both lowers the flow of FDI and shifts the 
ownership structure towards joint ventures. 
Svensson (2003)   Theory of the Firm, 
Rational Choice 
Theory 
Cross sectional variation in the incidence of bribery 
depends positively on its ability to pay (i.e. it’s current and 
expected profitability) and negatively on it’s ability to 
refuse payment (i.e. relocate operations)  
Robertson & 
Watson (2004) 
Theory of the Firm  The more rapid the change in the level of FDI the higher 
the level of corruption.  Characteristics of national culture 
associated with higher levels of corruption.    27 
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Hart (1995)   Resource-Based 
View of the Firm  
For certain companies, environmental social responsibility 
can constitute a resource or capability that leads to a 
sustained competitive advantage. 
Russo and Fouts 
(1997)  
Resource-Based 
View of the Firm  
For certain companies, environmental social responsibility 
can constitute a resource or capability that leads to a 
sustained competitive advantage. There is a positive 




Theory of the Firm   CSR is matrixed into business and corporate-level 
strategies. There is a neutral relation between CSR and 
profitability 
Hillman and 
Keim (2001)  
Resource-Based 
View of the Firm 
“Stakeholder Management” CSR is positively correlated 
with shareholder wealth creation (market value added); 
“Social Issues” CSR is not 
Baron (2001)  Theory of the Firm  The use of CSR to attract socially responsible consumers is 
referred to as strategic CSR, in the sense that firms provide 




Theory of the Firm  Activists and NGOs can play an important role in reducing 
information asymmetry with respect to CSR  
on the part of consumers. 
McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001) 
Theory of the Firm   Presents a supply/demand perspective on CSR, which 
implies that the firm’s ideal level of CSR can be 
determined by cost-benefit analysis.   
McWilliams, Van 
Fleet and Cory 
(2002) 
Resource-Based 
View of the Firm 
CSR strategies, when supported by political strategies, can 




Theory of the Firm/ 
Strategic Leadership 
Theory    
Certain aspects of CEO leadership can affect the propensity 
of firms to engage in CSR.  Companies run by 
intellectually stimulating CEOs do more strategic CSR than 
comparable firms   
Siegel and 
Vitaliano (2006) 
Theory of the Firm   Firms selling experience goods are more likely than firms 
selling search goods to be socially responsible; Firms 
selling credence services are the most likely to be socially 
responsible 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The eight questions are: 1) What is corruption?  2)Which countries are the most corrupt?  3) 
What are the characteristics of countries with high corruption?  4) What is the magnitude of 
corruption?  5) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption?  6) Can competition reduce 
corruption?   7)  Why have there been so few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption?  8)  
Does corruption adversely affect growth?  